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SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS FOR
DELIVERY OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
WILLIAM J. MORGAN*
T IS the writer's purpose to discuss here the remedy of specific per-
formance of contracts calling for the delivery of ordinary kinds of
personal property such as wood, clay, vegetables, and so forth, and not
unique articles such as heirlooms, objects of art, controlling stock in a
corporation, and so forth, the specific delivery of unique personality
being required almost as a matter of course.
The discussion following seeks to demonstrate that a rather common
expression of courts and even text writers: "That equity will not decree
the specific performance of a contract for the delivery of personal
property, which is not unique (such as heirlooms, and so forth)" is a
misstatement of a rule of law, and that whether the remedy of specific
performance can be successfully invoked has no relation to the charac-
ter of the property involved.
That delivery of "personal property in specie will be required in
proper cases as readily as the conveyance of real property will be de-
creed.
The true test is of course the adequacy of the remedy at law. The
misconception of the rule doubtless arises from the fact that in the
majority of cases damages are adequate compensation for breach of a
contract for the delivery of personal property.
Whether damages, are adequate, however, depends upon the circum-
stances of the case rather than in the nature of the property, except in
the case of those classes of property previously mentioned as calling for
specific delivery almost as a matter of course.
The New Jersey court has admirably stated the true rule in the fol-
lowing language:
Courts of equity decree this specific performance of contracts not
upon any distinction between realty and personalty, but because
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damages at law may not in the particular case afford a complete remedy.
Thus a court of equity decrees performance of a contract for land not
because of the real nature of the land but because damages at law, which
must be calculated upon the general money value of the land, may not
be a complete remedy to the purchaser to whom the land may have a
peculiar and special value. Our court of equity will not generally
decree performance of a contract for the sale of stock or goods, not
because of their personal nature, but because damages at law, calculated
upon the market price of the stock or goods, are as complete a remedy
to the purchaser as the delivery of the stock or goods contracted for
inasmuch as with the damages he may purchase the same quantity of
the like stock or goods.'
It must be borne in mind that the mere existence of a remedy at law
does not preclude equity from decreeing specific performance of a con-
tract that has been breached. The remedy at law must be adequate
to foreclose the right to specific performance. To be adequate the rem-
edy must be clear, efficient and commensurate with the right. Thus
where the owner of a contract for the purchase of real estate had
agreed to convey it to a third party, the Michigan court said: "If it were
conceded that equity would not enforce specifically a contract for the
purchase of land, where damages would afford an adequate remedy, we
should nevertheless be justified in enforcing this, because of the con-
tract obligations which have grown out of it."
Thus with the concession that damages would otherwise be adequate
the foregoing case illustrates how a circumstance (the agreement to re-
convey) makes the legal remedy entirely inadequate and incommensu-
rate with the right to a conveyance, for the purchaser himself being
liable for damages to the person to whom he has agreed to convey has
no assurance that a jury in that case will not award greater damages
than he may recover if he were relegated to a suit at law for damages.
Where a company engaged in making tomato catsup and canning to-
matoes contracted for the grower's crop of tomatoes, the New Jersey
court decreed specific performance of the grower's contract to deliver
the tomatoes. In ordering the decree the court said:
The fundamental principles which guide a court of equity in decree-
ing the specific performance of contracts are essentially the same
whether the contracts relate to realty or to personalty ..... .No
inherent difference between real estate and personal property controls
the exercise of the jurisdiction. Where no adequate remedy at law
exists, specific performance of a contract touching the sale of personal
property will be decreed with the same freedom as in the case of a con-
tract for the sale of land ..... In our own state contracts for the sale of
chattels have been frequently enforced and the inadequacy of the remedy
at law, based on the characteristic features of the contract or peculiar
SCutltng v. Dana, 25 N.J. Eq. 265 (27).
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situation and needs of the parties, have been the principal grounds of re-
lief.2 I think it clear that the present case falls well within the principles
defined by the cases already cited from our own state ..... It seems im-
material whether the entire acreage is contracted for to insure the full
pack, or whether a more limited acreage is contracted for and an esti-
mated available open market depended upon for the balance of the pack.
In either case a refusal of the parties who contract to supply a given
acreage to comply with their contracts leaves the factory helpless, except
to whatever extent an uncertain market may perchance supply the de-
ficiency .... The very existence of such contracts proclaims their neces-
sity to the economic management of the factory ..... The business and
its needs are extraordinary in that the maintenance of all of the condi-
tions prearranged to secure the pack are a necessity to insure the suc-
cessful operation of the plant ..... .The objection that to specifically
perform the contract personal services are required will not divest the
court of its powers to preserve the benefits of the contract. Defendant
may be restrained from selling the crop to others, and, if necessary, a
receiver can be appointed to harvest the crop.3
The New York Court granted specific performance of a contract for
the delivery of pulpwood for reasons stated as follows:
It is apparent that the plaintiff's remedy at law is inadequate. Any
attempt to prove damages that might result to the plaintiff by the non-
performance on the part of the defendant would encounter insuperable
difficulties, as the contract extends over a term of ten years and at the
election of the plaintiff may cover a period of ten years more. The
market price of pulp wood, the cost of transportation and the rate of
wages, all essential in determining damages, would be unknown quanti-
ties in a problem involving so long a period. Furthermore the con-
tingencies contemplated by the contract of the destruction in whole or
any part of the timber by fire or the taking of all or some portion of
the land by the state in the exercise of the right of eminent domain,
prevent an actual computation of damages in the future.4
It is sometimes said that specific performance will not be decreed
where a contract is not mutual. This mutuality of course refers to
mutuality of remedy but it does not mean that the remedy of each
party must be identical. Plaintiff may be entitled to specific perform-
ance although the only remedy of defendant in case of plaintiff's breach
would be damages but where either party in the event of breach has a
remedy, there. is sufficient mutuality to justify a decree for specific per-
formance, if the plaintiff's remedy at law is inadequate.
'Furman v. Clark, ii N.J. Eq 3o6; Ciating v. Dana, 25 N.J. Eq. 265, 27,;
Rothholz v. Schwartz, 46 N.J. Eq. 477, 481, 19 AtI. 312; Gannon v. Toole, (N.J.
Ch.) 32 AtI. 702; Hurd v. Groch, (N.J. Ch.) 51 Ati. 278; Duffy v. Kelly, 55 N.J.
Eq. 627, 629, 37 Alt. 597; Law v. Smith, 59 Atl. 327, 68 N.J. Eq. 8r.
' Curtice Bros. Co. v. Catts et. at. (N.J. Ct. of Chancery) 66 AtI. Rep. 935.
'St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lbr. Co., (N.Y.) 65 N.E. 967.
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A consideration of the cases cited suggests that before an action is
started for damages for breach of contract for the delivery of per-
sonal property, the appropriateness of such remedy should be carefully
analyzed and where the aggrieved party's rights cannot be thus ade-
quately protected, circumstances will be disclosed that justify invoking
the remedy of specific performance.
The writer has in mind a personal experience well illustrating this
situation. In 1889 the White Marble Lime Company entered into a
contract with a lumber company by the terms of which the lumber com-
pany agreed to deliver at the lime company's kilns all slabs and edgings
produced by the lumber company to the extent of the lime company's
requirements with a reservation of such wood as the lumber company
required for its own fuel. This contract was for twenty years and was
renewed for a like period to expire in 1929. The price agreed upon
was sixty-five cents per cord. In 1917 and I918 the price of this class
of fuel rose as high as $4.00 and $5.oo a cord in the vicinity of the lime
company's plant. The lumber company ceased making deliveries and it
was at once apparent that if an action were brought for damages, proof
of the extent of damages would be exceedingly difficult for the lumber
company did not measure its production of slabs and edgings, neither
did it measure its own consumption thereof for fuel. While the diffi-
culty of proof of damages may be a practical objection to a suit at
law, it is not such a legal objection as will entitle the suitor to specific
performance. The circumstances of the case, however, were such as to
justify an application for a decree of specific performance as will ap-
pear from the language of the court hereinafter quoted. To a bill filed
for specific performance an answer was filed interposing the following
defenses among others: That the contract was uncertain, was void for
want of mutuality, that plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, and
that a decree for specific performance would be impractical because it
would require the constant supervision of the court, and that specific
performance is refused where the rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.
In discussing these defenses the Michigan Supreme Court said:
(i) We fully agree with the court below upon the subject of
adequate remedy at law, and approve of the following language in the
opinion: That plaintiff's remedy at law is not adequate is plain. The
limited nature and uncertainty of the market, the necessity for going
into other markets where competition is keen for a supply, the incon-
venience and labor of finding a supply, the disarrangement of plaintiff's
business and calculations for the future, the impracticability of de-
termining the damages accurately, and the multiplicity of suits which
would be necessary to obtain recompense, render the situation one which
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cannot adequately be compensated at law.5 The questions of the con-
tinuing rights of the plaintiff and of the Thomas Berry Chemical
Company, and the claim that plaintiff must be deprived of its rights
because the rights of an innocent third party have intervened, should
be considered. After a careful examination of this record, it appears
to us that the defendant Thomas Berry Chemical Company has no
superior equities which should deprive the plaintiff of its right to an en-
forcement of its contract. The defendant Consolidated Lumber Com-
pany having agreed to sell and deliver all its softwood slabs and edgings
to the plaintiff, if needed, so far as the production of the mill would
enable it to do so, and reserving what wood the said defendant might
need for its own use, after carrying out that contract for a time, found
another and probably more profitable method of disposing of such slabs
and edgings under its contract with the defendant Thomas Berry
Chemical Company. The plaintiff's contract was first in time, there-
fore first in right.
The decree of the court below gives the chemical company paramount
rights as against the plaintiff. In our opinion it has no such rights; its
contract was subsequent to that of the plaintiff's and the plaintiff is
entitled to have its contract performed by the Consolidated Lumber
Company. It appears that the defendant Consolidated Lumber Com-
pany has made two contracts both of which it is obligated to perform,
and both of which were made with innocent parties; that with the
plaintiff being first in time. If the defendant Consolidated Lumber
Company is not complying with both contracts, it is because it has placed
itself voluntarily in that predicament, and there is no reason why the
plaintiff should not have specific performance of its contract according
to its spirit and letter. The contract, when construed in the light of
the circumstances existing at the time it was made is not uncertain or
ambiguous.6
The language of the contract with plaintiff provides that the de-
fendant Consolidated Lumber Company shall furnish slabs and edgings
so far as the production of its mill may enable it to do so; not so far
as its other subsequent fuel contracts may enable it to do so.
It is urged by plaintiff, and we think rightfully, that the production
of the lumber company's mill would enable it to furnish the plaintiff
practically all of the softwood slabs and edgings it produced, were it
not for the requirements and demands of the Thomas Berry Chemical
Company. We approve of the following language of the circuit judge
in his opinion: The contract renders plain the obligation of the de-
fendant to dispose of no softwood slabs or edgings, except for the
benefit of the plaintiff. The defendant is obligated to use the softwood
slabs, other than four-foot, for its own fuel purposes before resorting
to the four-foot slabs; and it has no right to sell or dispose of them
elsewhere, if, by so doing, it would necessitate the use of four-foot slabs
for fuel. The defendant is bound to furnish four-foot slabs and edgings
to plaintiff as far as the production of the mill will permit, which re-
quires the use of other waste first.
i6 Cyc. 41.
'Ardis v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. Co., 200 Mich. 4oo-4ii, 167 N.W. 5.
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The objections to the specific performance of this contract, as now
asked for by the plaintiff, are, in our opinion, theoretical rather than
practical. An amendment of the decree appealed from, substantially
as indicated by the plaintiff, would not require the supervision of the
court, would protect the rights of the plaintiff under the contract, and
would be doing substantial justice by carrying out the intention of the
parties.
Where an award of money damages is not an adequate remedy for
breach of contract to deliver personal property, it would manifestly be
a denial of complete justice to a plaintiff aggrieved by such breach to
confine him to an action at law for money damages. The purpose of
the law is to promote justice and not to work injustice, and while it
must be admitted that there is such a thing as a wrong without a remedy,
equity certainly will not deny relief to one equitably entitled thereto
when a remedy is available.
It would be absurd to deny this principle merely because the wrong
suffered grew out of the nondelivery of property which was personal in
its character.
